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Predicates such as ‘to be tall’, ‘to be related to Chomsky’ or ‘to know Latin’,
which intuitively denote permanent properties, are called individual-level predicates
(henceforth: i-predicates); predicates such as ‘to be available’, ‘to talk to Chomsky’
or ‘to study Latin’, which denote properties not necessarily permanent, are called
stage-level predicates (henceforth: s-predicates). An impressive list of grammatical
facts have been pointed out that set the two classes of predicates apart. The overall
picture is that s-predicates can do many more things than i-predicates can do: there
are constructions where s-predicates are fine but i-predicates are not (e.g. tempo-
ral and locative modification, ‘there’-construction, perception sentences, etc.) and
there are readings which are available with s-predicates but absent with i-predicates
(e.g. the existential reading for their bare plural subjects, the episodic reading, etc.);
some examples will be considered below. A theory of i-predicates should account
for why i-predicates cannot do the many things that s-predicates can do. In Section
2, I’ll sketch (the beginning of) a theory of i-predicates based on scalar implica-
tures. For instance, I’ll suggest that the sentence ‘?John is tall after dinner’ sounds
odd because it triggers the implicature that John is not tall also in non-after-dinner
times, which mismatches with the common knowledge that tallness is a permanent
property; see Percus (1997) and Maienborn (2004) among others, for a similar pro-
posal. The main goal of Section 2 is to show that this simple idea extends also
to less obvious cases, such as the restrictions on the readings of bare plural sub-
jects of i-predicates. In order for the account to work, the following assumption is
needed: that the algorithm for the computation of scalar implicatures is a purely
logical algorithm, blind to common knowledge (the Blindness Hypothesis). Section
1 introduces this and some other background assumptions.
1. The Blindness Hypothesis and Other Background Assumptions
The goal of this Section is to develop an account for the oddness of the sentences
(1), (2) and (3b), which have nothing to do with i-predicates.1
(1) a. ?Some (of the) parents of the victim got married in church.
b. ?John was found dead with some of his hands tied together.
(2) a. ?Every eye of the victim is blue.
b. ?Both eyes of the victim are blue.
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1The example in (3) is a slight variant of an example discussed in Percus (2001).
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(3) Scenario: five different competitions were held separately, monday through
friday; both Q and A know that the same guy won all five of them; Q wants
to know who this amazing guy is.
a. Q: Who is the guy who always won?
b. A: ?Each day, a firemen won.
To illustrate the intuitive idea of the account which I’ll pursue, consider for instance
sentence (1a), repeated below in (4a).
(4) a. ?Some parents of the victim got married in church.
b. The parents of the victim got married in church.
I suggest that the oddness of sentence (4a) can be accounted for by means of the
informal piece of reasoning in (5).
(5) a. On the one hand, sentence (4a) triggers the scalar implicature that the
speaker is not in a position to utter (4b), i.e. that he cannot presume that
all the parents of the victim got married in church.
b. On the other hand, it follows from common knowledge that people have
only two parents, hence (4a) cannot be true without (4b) being true too.
c. In conclusion, the oddness of (4a) follows from the mismatch between
(5a) and (5b).
The piece of reasoning in (5) was first suggested in the literature by Hawkins (1991),
and then discussed by Heim (1991). In the rest of this Section, I’ll recast this piece
of reasoning in more formal terms and apply it to (1), (2) and (3). In the next
Section, I will apply it to various properties of i-predicates.
1.1. On the Oddness of Sentences (1)
Each sentence is associated with both a plain meaning and a strengthened meaning,
namely the plain meaning enriched with its scalar implicatures. Following much
recent literature, I will assume that the strengthened meaning of a sentence ϕ is
obtained by applying to ϕ an exhaustivity operator EXH, i.e. that it is EXH(ϕ).
Many of the definitions of the exhaustivity operator EXH share the structure in (6):
EXH(ϕ) asserts ϕ and furthermore negates a bunch of alternatives ψ , namely all the
alternatives ψ in the set E xcl(ϕ) of the excludable alternatives given ϕ .
(6) EXH(ϕ) = ϕ ∧∧{¬ψ |ψ ∈ E xcl(ϕ)}.
The set E xcl(ϕ) of excludable alternatives wrt ϕ is a subset of the set A lt(ϕ) of
the scalar alternatives of ϕ , usually defined as in (7).
(7) The set A lt(ϕ) contains all and only those ψ’s that can be obtained from ϕ
by replacing one or more scalar items in ϕ with their Horn-mates.
Thus, these various definitions of the exhaustivity operator differ in how they carve
E xcl(ϕ) out of A lt(ϕ). Here, I’ll adopt the definition in (8), from Fox (2006).
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(8) a. A subset X = {ψ1,ψ2, . . .} of the set A lt(ϕ) is called an innocently ex-
cludable subset wrt ϕ iff ϕ ∧¬ψ1∧¬ψ2 ∧ . . . is not a contradiction.
b. A subset X ⊆ A lt(ϕ) is called a maximal innocently excludable subset
wrt ϕ iff there are no innocently excludable supersets of X in A lt(ϕ).
c. The intersection of all maximal innocently excludable subsets of A lt(ϕ)
wrt ϕ is denoted by E xcl(ϕ) and called the set of excludable alternatives.
The insight formalized by (8) is that the strengthened meaning EXH(ϕ) asserts ϕ
and excludes as many scalar alternatives ψ’s as can be excluded in a non-arbitrary
way without getting a contradiction; see Fox (2006) for discussion and examples.
Consider sentence ϕ in (9a). By (7), the set A lt(ϕ) of scalar alternatives
of ϕ contains the three alternatives ψFA, ψNS and ψNA in (9b), under the standard
assumption that 〈‘some’, ‘all’〉 and 〈‘few’, ‘none’〉 are Horn-scales. Of course, ψFA
is not excludable given ϕ , since ψFA is entailed by ϕ . Thus, the set of excludable
alternatives is E xcl(ϕ) = {ψNS,ψNA}, since these two alternatives ψNS and ψNA
can be negated consistently with ϕ . Thus, the strengthened meaning of sentence ϕ
is predicted to be (9c), namely “few boys did some of the readings and some boy
did some of the readings and some boy did all of the readings.” This result is of
course wrong: an utterance of ϕ does not in any way commit to the existence of a
boy who has done all of the readings.
(9) a. ϕ = Few boys did some of the readings.
b. i. ψFA = Few boys did all of the readings.
ii.ψNS = No boys did some of the readings.
iii.ψNA = No boys did all of the readings.
c. EXH(ϕ) = ϕ ∧¬ψNS ∧¬ψNA.
In order to get rid of this wrong inference, we need to get rid of the alternative
ψNA. Note the following crucial fact: while the alternative ψNS (asymmetrically)
entails ϕ , the alternative ψNA does not, since it is logically independent of ϕ . I thus
suggest that the set E xcl(ϕ) of alternatives excludable given ϕ should only contain
those scalar alternatives which asymmetrically entail ϕ .2 In other words, I submit
that clause (a) of definition (8) should be modified as follows.
(10) a. A subset X = {ψ1,ψ2, . . .} of scalar alternatives of ϕ is called an in-
nocently excludable subset wrt ϕ iff ϕ asymmetrically entails each ψ∈X
and furthermore ϕ ∧¬ψ1∧¬ψ2 ∧ . . . is not a contradiction.
This little modification of the original definition (8) will play a role only in 2.3.
The definition of the exhaustivity operator EXH that I have in place at this
point makes use of the two notions of asymmetric entailment and contradictoriness.
Both notions can be defined in terms of the notion of entailment. To complete the
definition of the exhaustivity operator, I thus need to spell out the relevant notion of
2Or, alternatively, which are not independent of ϕ . See also Fox’s (2006) footnote 35 for an
alternative solution, fully compatible with the proposal in this paper. I have chosen the option in
(10) only for the sake of explicitness.
104 Georgio Magri
entailment. Let W
ck be the subset of the set W of all possible worlds where common
knowledge holds, i.e. where people have only two parents, two eyes of the same
color, etc. The notion of entailment can thus be spelled out in two different ways:
as logic entailment (i.e. →
W
) or as entailment given common knowledge W
ck (i.e.
→
W ck
). The definitions are provided in (11).
(11) For any two propositions ϕ,ψ:
a. ψ logically entails ϕ (i.e. ψ →
W
ϕ) iff ψ ⊆ ϕ .
b. ψ entails ϕ given common knowledge W
ck (i.e ψ →W ck ϕ) iff ψ∩W ck ⊆ϕ .
Which one of these two notions is the one relevant for the definition of the exhaus-
tivity operator EXH? Here is my answer:
(12) The notion of entailment relevant for the definition of the exhaustivity op-
erator EXH is that of logic entailment rather than that of entailment given
common knowledge W
ck .
In other words, the computation of the strengthened meaning EXH(ϕ) is blind to
common knowledge. I’ll thus dub (12) as the Blindness Hypothesis (henceforth:
BH). See Fox and Hackl (2005) for independent evidence that the computation of
scalar implicatures is indeed blind to common knowledge. Thus, by definition, the
strengthened meaning cannot be a logical contradiction. This of course doesn’t
exclude the possibility of the strengthened meaning being a contradiction given
common knowledge. What happens in this case? Here is my answer:
(13) For every sentence ϕ , if its strengthened meaning EXH(ϕ) (computed with-
out taking common knowledge into account) is a contradiction given com-
mon knowledge (i.e. EXH(ϕ)∩W
ck = /0), then the sentence ϕ sounds odd.
For the time being, I present (12) and (13) as bare stipulations, and defer to future
work a more through discussion of their status and their consequences.
I am now in a position to account for the oddness of the two sentences (1).
For concreteness, consider sentence (1a), repeated as ϕ in (14a).
(14) a. ϕ = ?Some parents of the victim got married in church.
b. ψ = The parents of the victim got married in church.
Consider the alternative ψ in (14b). Let me assume that 〈‘some’, ‘the’〉 is a Horn-
scale; hence ψ is a scalar alternative of ϕ . Of course, ψ logically entails ϕ . But the
opposite doesn’t hold: in a world where the victim has three parents and only two
of them got married in church, ϕ would be true while ψ false. Hence, ψ logically
asymmetrically entails ϕ . Thus, E xcl(ϕ) = {ψ} and the strengthened meaning of
ϕ boils down to EXH(ϕ) = ϕ ∧¬ψ , namely “some but not all of the parents of the
victim got married in church.” Of course, this strengthened meaning EXH(ϕ) is a
contradiction given the piece of common knowledge that people have exactly two
parents. In fact, consider an arbitrary world w ∈W
ck: if ϕ is true in w, then two or
more of the parents of the victim got married in church in w; since w is compatible
with common knowledge W
ck , the victim has only two parents in w; hence, all of the
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parents of the victim got married in church in w, i.e. ψ is true too in w. The oddness
of sentence ϕ is thus predicted by (13). Note the crucial role that the BH (12) plays
in this piece of reasoning, as first pointed out by Heim (1991): if the strengthened
meaning were computed using entailment relative to common knowledge, then ψ
could not count as an excludable alternative wrt ϕ , since ϕ and ψ are equivalent
given the common knowledge that people have exactly two parents.
1.2. On the Oddness of Sentence (3b)
The oddness of (3b), as an answer to (3a), is intuitively due to the fact that (3b)
somehow mismatches with the presupposition introduced by the question (3a), namely
that a unique guy won each of the five competitions. Let me show how to capture
this mismatch. In the literature on the pragmatics of question/answer pairs, one
often finds the observation that sentence ϕ in (15b), as an answer to (15a), suggests
that the speaker doesn’t know, for each individual fireman, whether Fred talked to
him.
(15) a. Who did Fred talk to?
b. ϕ = He talked to some fireman.
This fact can be captured by assuming that the set of scalar alternatives of ϕ is (16).
For the sake of explicitness, let me assume that this set of alternatives is built by
replacing the DP ‘some fireman’ in ϕ with something like the definite description
‘the fireman/men such and such’ for all possible choices of ‘such and such’, which
thus need to be Horn-mates.
(16) A lt(ϕ) = {ψd(·) |d(·) ∈DeW },
where ψd(·) = λw : [[fireman]]w(d(w)) . [[talk]]w(Fred,d(w)).
Let me now apply this assumption to the case of our sentence (3b). Its LF is the one
in (17a). This LF corresponds to the truth conditions ϕ in (17b), namely that “for
each day of the competition, there was a firemen who won on that day.” Note that
‘each day’ has scope over ‘a fireman’ (i.e. ∀t > ∃x) in (17b).
(17) a. [[each day] [λ t [[a fireman] [λx [x won in t]]]]].
b. ϕ = λw .∀t [[[day]]w(t)→ [∃x[[[fireman]]w(x)∧ [[win]]w(x, t)]].
Consider now the LF in (18a): since it is obtained from (17a) by replacing ‘a fire-
men’ by ‘the fireman such and such’ (abbreviated as ‘the fireman P’), then the LF
(18a) is a scalar alternative of the LF (17a). The LF (18a) yields the truth conditions
ψP in (18b).
(18) a. [[each day] [λ t [[the fireman P] [λx [x won in t]]]]].
b. ψP = λw .∀t [[[day]]w(t)→ [[[the fireman P]]w ∈ [[win]]w(t)]].
Let’s look at these alternatives ψP in some more detail. Consider the formula β
in (19b), which is identical to ϕ in (17b) only with the opposite scope relationship
between ‘every day’ and ‘a fireman’. The logical equivalence in (19) is easy to
verify.
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(19) For every possible world w: α(w)=1 iff ¬β (w)=1.
a. α
.
=
∧{¬ψP |P}.
b. β .= λw .∃x
[
[[fireman]]w(x)∧∀t [[[day]]w(t)→ [[win]]w(x, t)]
]
.
Let me now argue that the strengthened meaning EXH(ϕ) of the odd sentence ϕ
in (17b) is the one in (20), i.e. that each ψP is excludable wrt ϕ . Note that each
ψP logically asimmetrically entails ϕ . Thus, under the assumption that there are
no other relevant alternatives, it is sufficient to show that EXH(ϕ) in (20) is not a
logical contradiction. And because of the logical equivalence in (19), it is sufficient
to show that ϕ ∧¬β is not a logical contradiction. And of course it is not, since
there are possible worlds were different firemen have won on different days, where
thus ϕ is true but β false.
(20) EXH(ϕ) = ϕ ∧
∧
{¬ψP |P}︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
α
Note nonetheless that EXH(ϕ) = ϕ∧¬β is a contradiction relative to the presuppo-
sition introduced by the question in (3a), namely that a single fireman has won on
every day. The oddness of ϕ in (3b) as an answer to (3a) thus follows from (13).
1.3. On the Oddness of Sentences (2)
The account I have in place so far doesn’t quite work for the two sentences (2),
since these two sentences express the strongest meaning among their alternatives.
I’ll suggest that their oddness is due to the fact that, nonetheless, they do not carry
the strongest presupposition. To keep things simple, assume that presuppositional
items denote partial functions of the right type. Hence, a sentence ϕ containing
a presuppositional item denotes a partial function from possible worlds into truth-
values. Let ϕprs be the domain of such a function, namely the presupposition carried
by ϕ . Assume that strengthening is performed also at the level of presupposition,
i.e. that we can associate with each sentence ϕ its strengthened presupposition
EXH(ϕprs). The definition of the strengthened presupposition EXH(ϕprs) is identical
to that of strengthened meaning given above, namely (21), where the set E xcl(ϕprs)
is defined just as in (10), replacing ϕ by ϕprs and ψ by ψprs .3
(21) EXH(ϕprs) = ϕprs ∧
∧{¬ψprs |ψprs ∈ E xcl(ϕprs)
}
.
Of course, I want to maintain that the Blindness Hypothesis holds also for the com-
putation of strengthened presuppositions, as stated in (22) which I’ll refer to as the
BH′. The BH′ suggests the variant of assumption (13) stated in (23). The two
hypotheses (22) and (23) are an old idea, suggested by Heim (1991) and then de-
veloped by Sauerland (2003a) under the name of Maximize Presupposition.
3I am assuming that the set of scalar alternatives used to compute the strengthened presupposition
and the strengthened meaning is the same. The only difference is that in the former case we look at
the presuppositions of those alternatives while in the latter we look at their meaning.
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(22) The notion of entailment relevant for the computation of the strengthened
presupposition EXH(ϕprs) is that of logic entailment “→W ” rather than that
of entailment relative to common knowledge “→
W ck
”.
(23) For every sentence ϕ , if its strengthened presupposition EXH(ϕprs) (com-
puted without taking common knowledge into account) is a contradiction
given common knowledge (i.e. EXH(ϕprs)∩W ck = /0), then ϕ sounds odd.
I am now in a position to account for the oddness of the two sentences (2). For
concreteness, consider (2a), repeated as ϕ in (24a).4
(24) a. ϕ = ?Every eye of the victim is blue.
b. ψ = The eyes of the victim are blue.
Consider the alternative ψ in (24b). Let me assume that 〈‘every’, ‘the’〉 is a Horn-
scale; hence, ψ is a scalar alternative of ϕ . Let us thus briefly pause on the proper
semantics of sentence ψ . Plural predication with distributive predicates, as in the
case of ψ , requires the predicate to be operated upon by the distributive operator
Dist. Following for instance Link (1983), I take the function Dist([[VP]]w) to be
true of a plurality x iff the property [[VP]]w holds of all the atomic parts y of x (i.e.
y ≤AT x). Thus, ϕ and ψ end up having the same meaning. Nonetheless, they have
different presuppositions. In fact, the distributivity operator Dist does something
more: it also introduces the presupposition that the property [[VP]]w either holds of
all the atomic parts y of x or else it does not hold of any of them. This presupposition
is called the homogeneity presupposition in Gajewski (2005) and was first discussed
in Fodor (1970). Thus, the proper semantics of the distributive operator Dist is that
in (25). The homogeneity presupposition can be detected by means of negation:
the sentence ‘Sue didn’t see the boys’ conveys that Sue didn’t see any of the boys,
which differs from the plain meaning (namely that “Sue didn’t see every boy”) but
does follow from it plus the homogeneity presupposition.
(25) Dist([[VP]]w) = λx : YESw(x)∨NOw(x) .∀y[y ≤AT x → [[VP]]w(y)].
a. YESw(x)= iff [[VP]]w(y) for every y such that y ≤AT x.
b. NOw(x)= iff ¬[[VP]]w(y) for every y such that y ≤AT x.
4One might be tempted to account for the oddness of (24a) by assuming that ‘every’ carries an
anti-duality presupposition on its restrictor, which in the case of sentence (24a) is violated in every
world in W
ck . Sauerland (2003b) offers the following contrast as an argument against this account.
(i) Scenario: several candidates applied; some have written only one paper, others two, and the
rest have written more than two. The selection committee decides:
a. ?Every candidate should send [the paper of his].
b. Every candidate should send [every paper of his].
The oddness of sentence (a) is immediately accounted for under the assumption that the uniqueness
presupposition of the definite ‘the paper of his’ is projected universally; if ‘every paper of his’ had
an anti-duality presupposition, it would be predicted to project universally as well and sentence (b)
would be predicted to suffer from presupposition failure just as sentence (a), contrary to facts.
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Let’s now go back to ϕ and ψ in (24). By (25), ψ bears the homogeneity presuppo-
sition ψprs in (26b), according to which the eyes of the victim are either both blue
or else none of them is. No such presupposition is carried by ϕ , as stated in (26a).
Here, I am ignoring the existence presupposition.
(26) a. ϕprs = W .
b. ψprs = YES∪NO.
i. YES = {w |all eyes of the victim are blue in w}.
ii.NO = {w |none of the eyes of the victim is blue in w}.
Of course, ψprs asymmetrically entails ϕprs . Under the assumption that there are no
other excludable presuppositions, E xcl(ϕprs) = {ψprs} and the strengthened presup-
position of ϕ boils down to EXH(ϕprs) = ϕprs ∧¬ψprs = ¬ψprs . This strengthened
presupposition is a contradiction given the common knowledge that people have
eyes of the same color, since ψprs follows from such a common knowledge. The
oddness of sentence (24a) is thus predicted by (23). Note again the crucial role that
the BH′ (22) plays in this piece of reasoning: if the strengthened presupposition
were computed using entailment relative to common knowledge, then ψprs could
not count as an excludable alternative wrt ϕprs , since ϕprs and ψprs are equivalent
given the common knowledge that people have eyes of the same color.
2. Application to Individual-Level Predicates
Let me assume that there is no relevant grammatical difference between s- and i-
predicates, contra Kratzer (1995), Diesing (1992), Chierchia (1995). For example,
there is no difference with respect to the reconstruction possibilities of their subjects
or with respect to their argumental structure, namely:
(27) Both ‘tall’ and ‘available’ have a davidsonian argument which, for the sake
of simplicity, I will naı¨vely take to range over times t∈T .
What is the relevant difference between s- and i-predicates, then? I assume that all
that’s special about an i-predicate such as ‘tall’ is (28), which crudely captures the
intuition that i-predicates denote permanent properties.
(28) For every world w∈W
ck compatible with common knowledge, for every
individual d∈De and for every time t ′∈T , if [[tall]]w(d, t ′), then [[tall]]w(d, t)
for every time t in the life span inw(d, ·) of d in w.
As noted at the beginning, a theory of i-predicates should account for why i-predicates
cannot do the many things that s-predicates can do. I want to suggest that, under
assumptions (27) and (28), such a theory is a theorem of the more general theory
of oddness sketched in Section 1. Namely, that those many things that i-predicates
cannot do would correspond to truth-conditions whose strengthened meaning (or
strengthened presupposition), computed accordingly to the BH (or the BH′), would
be a contradiction given common knowledge (28), and are thus ruled out by (13)
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(or (23)). In this Section, I consider three such things that i-predicates cannot do,
and show that they can be accounted for in the same way I have accounted above
for the oddness of (1), (2) and (3b), respectively.
2.1. Locative and Temporal Modification
Contrary to s-predicates, i-predicates (often) ban locative and temporal modifica-
tion, as shown by the different status of the two sentences (29).
(29) a. John is available after dinner.
b. ?John is tall after dinner.
The truth conditions of the fine sentence (29a), with the habitual s-predicate ‘avail-
able’, are usually taken to be those in (30a). These truth-conditions contain a
generic operator GENt which ranges over times and takes two arguments. Its first
argument, called the restrictive clause, is the set of those times which satisfy the
contextually supplied restriction C and furthermore are after-dinner times. The sec-
ond argument of the generic operator, called its nuclear scope, is the set of those
times at which John is available. Thus, (30a) says that “for every after-dinner time t
which satisfies C, John is available at that time t.” Under the assumption that there
is no difference between s- and i-predicates, the same truth-conditions should be
available also for sentence (29b), with the i-predicate ‘tall’. I have written them
down as ϕ in (30b). Thus, the problem of accounting for the oddness of (29b) boils
down to the problem of ruling out ϕ in (30b). Let me now show that these truth
conditions ϕ in (30b) can be ruled out in the same way as I have ruled out the odd
sentences (1) in Section 1.
(30) a. λw . GENt
[
Cw( j, t)∧ [[after-dinner]]w(t)][[[available]]w( j, t)].
b. ϕ = λw . GENt
[
Cw( j, t)∧ [[after-dinner]]w(t)][[[tall]]w( j, t)].
Consider (31a), with the truth-conditions ψ in (31b). Note that ψ is obtained from
ϕ by modifying the restrictive clause of the generic operator. Let me assume that the
restrictive clause can be modified without falling out of the set of scalar alternatives
of ϕ . This assumption is supported by the fact that sentence (29a) does indeed
trigger the implicature that it is false (or that the speaker doesn’t know) that John is
available in non-after-dinner times. Thus, ψ is a scalar alternative of ϕ .
(31) a. John is tall.
b. ψ .= λw . GENt
[
inw( j, t)][[[tall]]w( j, t)].
Of course, ψ logically entails ϕ . Furthermore, ϕ does not logically entail ψ: in
fact, consider a world (not in W
ck) where John is tall only after dinner and note
that ϕ is true but ψ false in such a world. Under the assumption that ψ is the only
relevant alternative5 of ϕ , E xcl(ϕ) = {ψ} and the strengthened meaning of ϕ boils
down to EXH(ϕ) = ϕ ∧¬ψ , namely that “John is tall only after-dinner.” Of course,
5This is not quite true, since I should consider any possible modification of the restrictive clause;
it is straightforward to check that this simplification doesn’t affect the proposal.
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this strengthened meaning is a contradiction given the common knowledge W
ck in
(28): if John is tall at after-dinner times in w and if w is in W
ck , then John is tall
through out his entire life span in w. Thus, ϕ in (30b) is ruled out by (13).6
2.2. Existential Bare Plural Subjects
The bare plural subject (henceforth: BPS) ‘firemen’ of the s-predicate ‘available’ in
(32a) admits both the generic and the existential reading; the BPS of the i-predicate
‘tall’ in (32b) instead lacks the existential reading and only allows the generic one.
(32) a. Firemen are available. ∃-BPS, GEN-BPS
b. Firemen are tall. ∗∃-BPS, GEN-BPS
Let me assume that the truth-conditions for the existential reading of the BPS ‘fire-
men’ in (32a) are those in (33c) (where Cw([[firemen]]w, t) is some contextually rel-
evant set of times where firemen are present), namely that “for every time t which
satisfies C, there is a fireman x who is available at t.” Note that the generic operator
GENt has wide scope over the existential operator ∃x in (33c). I assume that this
scope configuration is the only possible one. I take this to be an instance of a more
general property of existential bare plurals: that they always select the narrowest
possible scope; see Carlson (1977). That GENt > ∃x is the only scope configura-
tion, follows from any proper theory of bare plurals, such as the Heimian semantics
adopted in Diesing (1992) or the semantics developed in Chierchia (1995, 1998).
To develop my proposal, I need the latter; here is a sketch.
(33) a. [firemen [λx [GEN [x available]]]].
b. λw . [[firemen]]w ∈ λx.GENt [Cw(x, t)][[[available]]w(x, t)].
c. λw . GENt [Cw([[firemen]]w, t)][∃x[[[firemen]]w(x)∧ [[available]]w(x, t)]].
Assume that the LF of our sentence (32a) is (33a), which is straightforwardly
mapped onto the truth-conditions (33b). Assume that bare plurals denote kinds.
What happens when the predicate [[available]]w is saturated with the kind [[firemen]]w?
Since [[available]]w is a predicate true of ordinary individuals and ‘firemen’ denotes
a kind, the computation is stuck. Chierchia suggests that the mismatch is solved
by means of the type shifter Derived Kind Predication 〈·〉DKP in (34). The exis-
tential quantification over firemen in (33c) is brought about by resorting to 〈·〉DKP
in order to solve the mismatch between the kind [[firemen]]w and the predicate of
ordinary individuals [[available]]w. Just as any other type shifting device, 〈·〉DKP is
only triggered by a mismatch. In other words, 〈·〉DKP is only triggered in the very
6Note that i-predicates do not always ban temporal modification: although sentence (29b) with
the temporal modifier ‘after dinner’ sounds odd, a sentence such as ‘John knows Latin since he was
fifteen’, with the temporal modifier ‘since he was fifteen’, sounds fine. This contrast is difficult
to derive in frameworks which attribute the oddness of (29b) to some syntactic peculiarity of i-
predicates, such as the ones by Kratzer (1995) and Chierchia (1995). However, this contrast is
predicted by the account just sketched: the strengthened meaning of the latter sentence, namely that
“John knows Latin only since he was fifteen”, is compatible with common knowledge, contrary to
the strengthened meaning of sentence (29b), namely that “John is tall only after dinner.”
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embedded position at which we attempt to apply the bare plural [[firemen]]w to the
predicate [[available]]w. Thus, existential bare plurals always have the narrowest
possible scope because of the “last resort” nature of 〈·〉DKP .
(34) For every predicate of ordinary individuals P:
〈P〉DKP .= λxk .∃yo[yo ≤ xk ∧P(yo)]
where: xk is a variable over kinds, yo is a variable over ordinary individuals
and ≤ is the relation which holds between a kind and one of its instances.
Under the assumption that there are no grammatical differences between s- and i-
predicates, the same LF and truth-conditions should be available also for sentence
(32b), as stated in (35). Thus, the problem of accounting for the lack of the existen-
tial reading of the BPS ‘firemen’ of the i-predicate ‘tall’ in (32b) boils down to the
problem of ruling out ϕ in (35c), with narrow scope existential quantification over
firemen. Note that these truth conditions are formally analogous to those in (17b)
in Section 1. Let me thus argue that these truth conditions ϕ in (35b) can be ruled
out in the same way I have ruled out those in (17b).
(35) a. [firemen [λx [GEN [x tall]]]].
b. λw . [[firemen]]w ∈ λx.GENt [Cw(x, t)][[[tall]]w(x, t)].
c. ϕ = λw . GENt [C([[firemen]]w, t)][∃x[[[firemen]]w(x)∧ [[tall]]w(x, t)]].
Let me assume that 〈‘firemen’, ‘the firemen such and such’〉 is a Horn-scale. Con-
sider the LF in (36a): since it is obtained from the LF in (35a) by replacing ‘firemen’
with ‘the firemen such and such’ (here abbreviated as ‘the firemen P’), the LF (36a)
is a scalar alternative of the LF (35a). The LF (36a) yields the truth-conditions
in (36b), where the default distributivity operator Dist has been used to perform
distributive predication. By virtue of the homogeneity presupposition of Dist in
(25), these truth conditions can be made explicit as in (36c), where I have used the
shorthand [[the firemen P]]w .= d(w).
(36) a. [[the firemen P] [λx [GEN [x tall]]]].
b. λw . [[the firemen P]]w ∈ Dist
(
λx.GENt [inw(x, t)][[[tall]]w(x, t)]
)
.
c. ψP .= λw : YES(w)∨NO(w) . ∧ x≤ATd(w)GENt [inw(x, t)][[[tall]]w(x, t)]
i. YES(w) = 1 iff GENt [inw(x, t)][[[tall]]w(x, t)] for every x s.t. x ≤AT dw
ii.NO(w) = 1 iff ¬GENt [inw(x, t)][[[tall]]w(x, t)] for every x s.t. x ≤AT dw
Let’s consider these ψP’s in some more detail. In particular, let’s consider β in
(37b), which is roughly as ϕ in (35b) only with the opposite scope configuration
∃x > GENt , and let me establish the logical equivalence stated in (37). Let me show
that, if ¬β (w)=1, then α(w)=1. By contradiction, suppose α(w) 6=1. Hence there
is at least one ψP which is either true or undefined in w. This in turn means that
there must exist at least one firemen in w who is tall throughout his entire life span
in w. Hence, β (w)=1, contradicting the hypothesis. Let me now show that, if
α(w)=1, then ¬β (w)=1. Consider an arbitrary fireman in w, say John. Of course,
there is some P such that John ≤AT [[the firemen P]]w (and, furthermore, such that
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ψP asymmetrically entails ϕ). Note that ψP must be false in w, because of the
hypothesis α(w)=1, i.e. ψP(w)=. By virtue of the homogeneity presupposition
(25) introduced by the distributive operator Dist, ψP(w)= iff for every x such that
x ≤AT[[the firemen P]]w, x is not tall throughout his entire life span in w. Hence in
particular the fireman John is not tall throughout his entire life span in w. Since this
reasoning can be repeated for every other fireman in w besides John, then¬β (w)=1.
The logical equivalence in (37) is thus established.
(37) For every world w∈W : α(w)=1 iff ¬β (w)=1.
a. α =
∧{¬ψP |ψP a→W ϕ}.
b. β = λw .∃x[[[fireman]]w(x)∧GENt [inw(x, t)][[[tall]]w(x, t)]].
Let me now argue that the strengthened meaning of ϕ is the one in (38), i.e. that
all ψP’s (which asymmetrically entail ϕ) are excludable wrt ϕ . Under the assump-
tion that there are no other relevant alternatives besides ψP’s, it suffices to argue
that EXH(ϕ) in (38) is not a logical contradiction. And by virtue of the logical
equivalence in (37), it suffices to exhibit a world where ϕ∧¬β is true.
(38) EXH(ϕ) = ϕ ∧
∧
{¬ψP |ψP a→W ϕ}︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
α
Consider the possible world w represented in (39). Suppose that there are three
firemen in w, namely d, d and d. Their life span is represented with a thin
segment. The thickened portion of each segment represents the portion of each life
span throughout which the individual is tall in w. The long thin line at the top of
the picture is the time axis T ; the thickened portion of it is the set of those times
in the restrictive clause of formula ϕ , i.e. Cw([[firemen]]w, ·). Note that ϕ is true in
this world w, because for each time t in the set Cw, either d or d or d is tall at t.
Note furthermore that β is false in w, since no one of the three firemen d, d, d
is tall throughout his entire life span in w. Thus, EXH(ϕ) = ϕ ∧¬β is not a logical
contradiction.
(39)
d3:
d2:
d2:
Cw([[firemen]]w, ·)
Note nonetheless that EXH(ϕ) = ϕ ∧ ¬β is a contradiction given the common
knowledge W
ck in (28), precisely because no world such as the one in (39), in
which firemen are tall only throughout a portion of their life span, can ever belong
to W
ck . In fact, suppose that EXH(ϕ) were true in a world w ∈W ck . Hence ϕ must
be true and β false in w. Since ϕ is true in w, then there must exist at least one
fireman in w who is tall in at least one instant in w, say John. Since w is compatible
with the common knowledge W
ck in (28), John is tall throughout his entire life span
in w. But then β has got to be true too in w. Hence, EXH(ϕ) = ϕ ∧¬β is a contra-
diction given the common knowledge W
ck in (28). Let me wrap up: the existential
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reading for the BPS ‘firemen’ of the i-predicate ‘tall’ of sentence (32b) would cor-
respond to truth conditions ϕ in (35c), where existential quantification over firemen
is embedded under the generic operator; because of this scope configuration, the
strengthened meaning of these truth conditions ϕ ends up being a contradiction
given the common knowledge W
ck in (28); these truth conditions ϕ are thus ruled
out by (13) and the lack of the existential reading of the BPS of i-predicates is thus
accounted for.
To conclude my discussion, let me consider the following variant (40) of
sentence (32b), with the indefinite ‘some firemen’ instead of the PBS ‘firemen’.
This sentence (40) does of course admit the existential reading which is unavailable
for (32b), namely “there is a firemen who is tall.” Let me thus make sure that my
proposal does not rule out the existential reading for this sentence (40) too.
(40) Some fireman is tall.
The crucial difference between this sentence (40) and the sentence (32b) I have
considered so far, is the following: as noted above, (32b) is only compatible with
narrow scope existential quantification over firemen; this is false for (40): its LF
(41a) yields truth conditions (41b), trivially equivalent to β in (37b), repeated in
(41c), where existential quantification has scope over the generic operator.
(41) a. [[A fireman] [λx [GEN [x is tall]]]].
b. λw . [[a fireman]]w ∋ λx . GENt [inw(x, t)][[[tall]]w(x, t)].
c. β = λw .∃x[[[fireman]]w(x)∧GENt [inw(x, t)][[[tall]]w(x, t)]].
Let me thus show that, precisely because of this different scope configuration, the
strengthened meaning of β in (41c) is not a contradiction given common knowl-
edge. Under the assumption that ‘some fireman’ and ‘the firemen such and such’
are Horn-mates, each ψP in (36c) is a scalar alternative of β in (41c) (and, further-
more, each ψP asymmetrically entails β ). Note that in the case of β , contrary to the
case of ϕ in (35c), it is not possible to exclude all such ψP, since ∧¬ψP is logically
equivalent to β . Furthermore, there is not any single ψP that can be left out in a
non-arbitrary way. Thus, according to (8), no such ψP will ever make it into the set
of alternatives excludable given β and thus there is no way that the strengthened
meaning of β can happen to be a contradiction given common knowledge.
2.3. Existential Bare Plural Subjects in the Scope of a Universal Operator
Fox (1995) observes that, quite surprisingly, the existential reading of the BPS of an
i-predicate becomes available when the BPS is in the scope of a universal operator
(or, more generally, in the scope of an operator which does not commute with the
existential BPS). Here is one of his examples:
(42) a. Jewish women are related to Chomsky. ∗∃-BPS
b. Jewish women are related to every Jewish man.
√∃-BPS
As expected, the BPS ‘Jewish women’ in (42a) does not admit the existential read-
ing. In sentence (42b), the definite ‘Chomsky’ has been replaced by the universal
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DP ‘every Jewish man’ and surprisingly the BPS ‘Jewish women’ admits the ex-
istential reading, i.e. the sentence can mean that “for every Jewish man there is a
Jewish woman who is related to him.” I’ll now show that this contrast follows from
the proposal developed so far.
Of course, the existential reading of the BPS of (42a) is ruled out in the same
way as the existential reading of the BPS of (32b), since the reasoning in 2.2 can
be repeated with [[related to]]w(·,Chomsky, t) in place of [[tall]]w(·, t). Let’s now see
what happens when this same line of reasoning is applied to (42b). Consider its LF
(43a), obtained by leaving ‘Jewish women’ in [Spec, IP] and by adjoining ‘every
Jewish man’ to VP by QR. This LF yields the truth-conditions in (43b), which in
turn are equivalent to ϕ in (43c) through 〈·〉DKP, as discussed above. These truth
conditions ϕ correctly capture the reading of sentence (42b) we are after. Thus, let
me show that my proposal does not rule out these truth conditions ϕ .
(43) a. [[Jewish women] [λx [[every Jewish man] λy [x related to y]]]].
b. λ w . [[women]]w∈λ x.
[
[[every man]]w∋λ y.GENt [Cw(x,y,t)][[[related]]w(x,y,t)]
]
.
c. ϕ = λ w . [[every man]]w∋λ y.
[
GENt [C([[women]]w,y,t)][∃x[[[women]]w(x)∧[[related]]w(x,y,t)]]
]
.
By replacing ‘Jewish women’ with ‘the Jewish women such and such’ in (43a),
we get (44a). The latter yields the truth conditions in (44b), where the distribu-
tive operator Dist has to be used in order to perform distributive predication. Truth
conditions (44b) are in turn equivalent to ψP in (44c), due to the homogeneity pre-
supposition (25) of Dist (I am using again the shorthand dw .= [[the women P]]w).
(44) a. [[The Jewish women P] [λ x [[every Jewish man] λ y [x related to y]]]].
b. λ w . [[the women P]]w∈Dist
(
λ x.
[
[[every man]]w∋λ y.GENt [Cw(x,y,t)][[[related]]w(x,y,t)]
])
.
c. ψP = λw : YES(w)∨NO(w) .YES(w).
i. YES(w)=1 iff OMNI-RELATEDw(x) for every x s.t. x ≤AT dw,
ii.NO(w)=1 iff ¬OMNI-RELATEDw(x) for every x s.t. x ≤AT dw,
iii.OMNI-RELATEDw(x) .=
.
= [[every Jewish man]]w ∋ λy.GENt [Cw(x,y, t)][[[related]]w(x,y, t)].
Note that the logical equivalence in (45) holds, as can be verified in the same way as
I did above for the equivalence (37).7 Note the following crucial difference between
7For the sake of explicitness, let me verify (45) explicitly. First, let me show that, if ¬β (w)=
1, then α(w)=1. By contradiction, suppose α(w) 6=1. Hence there is at least one ψP which is
either true or undefined in w. This in turn means that there must exist at least a Jewish woman
in w, say Mary, such that OMNI-RELATEDw(Mary)=, i.e. Mary is related to every Jewish man
in w. Hence, β (w)=1, contradicting the hypothesis. Let me now show that, if α(w)=1, then
¬β (w)=1. Consider an arbitrary Jewish woman in w, say Mary. Of course, there is some P such
that Mary ≤ AT [[the women P]]w (and, furthermore, such that ψP asymmetrically entails ϕ). Note
that ψP must be false in w, because of the hypothesis α(w)=1, i.e. ψP(w)=. By virtue of the
homogeneity presupposition, ψP(w)= iff for every x such that x ≤AT [[the women P]]w, it happens
that ¬OMNI-RELATEDw(x)=, i.e. x is not related to every Jewish man in w. Hence in particular the
Jewish women Mary is not related to every Jewish man in w. Since this reasoning can be repeated
for every other Jewish woman in w besides Mary, then ¬β (w)=1. The logical equivalence in (45) is
thus established.
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(45) and (37): in β in (45), the existential quantifier over Jewish women has wide
scope not only over the generic operator but also over ‘every Jewish man’ (whose
denotation I am representing here just as ∀y).
(45) For every world w∈W : α(w)=1 iff ¬β (w)=1.
a. α =
∧{¬ψP |ψP a→W ϕ}.
b. β = λw .∃x
[
[[woman]]w(x)∧∀y
[
GENt [Cw(x,y, t)][[[related]]w(x,y, t)]
]]
.
Let me now argue that the strengthened meaning EXH(ϕ) of ϕ is the one in (46).
i.e. that all the alternatives ψP in (44b) are excludable wrt ϕ in (43b). Under
the assumption that there are no other relevant alternatives besides ψP’s, it suffices
to argue that EXH(ϕ) in (46) is not a logical contradiction. And by virtue of the
equivalence in (45), it suffices to show that ϕ ∧¬β is not a logical contradiction.
(46) EXH(ϕ) = ϕ ∧
∧
{¬ψP |ψP a→W ϕ}︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
α
To this end, consider the following possible world w: there are only two Jewish
men a and a and two Jewish women b and b in w; furthermore, the woman b is
related only to the man a and the woman b is related only to the man a. Note that
ϕ is true in such a world w (with a judicious choice of the restrictive clause C), since
for every Jewish man there is a Jewish woman related to him. Note furthermore that
β is false in such a world w, since there is no Jewish woman related to every Jewish
man. Thus, ϕ ∧¬β is true in such a world w and EXH(ϕ) = ϕ ∧¬β . Note now that
such a world w could very well be compatible with the common knowledge W
ck in
(28). Hence, the strengthened meaning EXH(ϕ) of ϕ in (43b) is not a contradiction
given common knowledge and the existential reading for the BPS of (42b) is not
ruled out by (13).8
The modification suggested in (10) hasn’t played any role in the paper so far;
but it does play a crucial role to secure the latter result; here is why. Consider the
alternatives in (47) for every P, which are obtained from (43a) by replacing ‘Jewish
women’ by ‘the Jewish women such and such’ and furthermore ‘every Jewish man’
by ‘some Jewish man’. Of course, (47) is a scalar alternative of ϕ in (43c) for each
P. It is easy to check that all these alternatives (47) can be negated consistently with
ϕ and that the strengthened meaning EXH(ϕ) so derived is a contradiction given the
common knowledge W
ck in (28). Thus, we need to get the alternatives in (47) out of
the set of excludable alternatives, in order to prevent the attested existential reading
of the BPS in (42b) from being ruled out by (13).
(47) λ w . [[the women P]]w∈Dist
(
λ x.
[
[[some man]]w∋λ y.GENt [Cw(x,y,t)][[[related]]w(x,y,t)]
])
.
8Note furthermore that the approach developed so far predicts that the existential reading for the
BPS of an i-predicate is available in the scope of a universal quantifier over individuals but not in
the scope of a universal modal. The crucial difference between the two cases is that modals quantify
over worlds and the scalar item [[the firemen such and such]]w has world-dependence built into it.
This prediction is borne out: the BPS of a sentence such as ‘Firemen must be tall’ does not allow
the existential reading.
This problem is avoided by the modification in (10), since the alternatives in (47)
are logically independent of ϕ in (43b) and thus they cannot contribute to EXH(ϕ).
2.4. Overt Q-Adverbs
Contrary to s-predicates, i-predicates cannot occur with an overt Q-adverb (such a
‘always’ or ‘often’), as shown by the different status of the two sentences (48). The
oddness of sentence (48a) is particularly puzzling for my proposal, given that I am
assuming that the corresponding fine sentence without overt ‘always’ contains its
phonologically null counterpart GEN, as in (31).
(48) a. ?John is always tall.
b. John is always available.
(49) a. Firemen are always tall.
b. A firemen is always tall.
Furthermore, Kratzer (1995) points out that sentence (48a) becomes fine if the def-
inite ‘John’ is replaced by either a bare plural or an indefinite, as in (49). Let me
argue that the oddness of (48a), repeated as ϕ in (50a), can be accounted in the
same way I accounted above for the oddness of the sentences (2).9 Consider the
alternative ψ in (50b) and assume that ψ is a scalar alternative of ϕ .
(50) a. ϕ = ?John is always tall.
b. ψ = John is GEN tall.
Of course, ψ and ϕ have the same meaning; nonetheless, they crucially have differ-
ent presuppositions. As argued for example in von Fintel (1997), the covert generic
operator GEN carries the homogeneity presupposition in (51), namely that the nu-
clear scope of GEN holds of each item in its restrictive clause or else is false for each
such item. The homogeneity presupposition can be detected by means of negation:
the sentence ‘Italians don’t eat raw fish’ conveys that no single Italian eats raw fish,
which is different from the plain meaning (namely that “it is false that every Ital-
ian eats raw fish”) but does follow from the plain meaning plus the homogeneity
presupposition. No such presupposition is carried by overt ‘always’.
(51) [[GENv,...,vn [RC(v, . . . ,vn)][NS(v, . . . ,vn)]]] = λ w : YES(w)∨NO(w) .YES(w)
a. YES(w) = 1 iff [[NS]](v, . . . ,vn) for every v, . . . ,vn such that [[RC]](v, . . . ,vn);
b. NO(w) = 1 iff ¬[[NS]](v, . . . ,vn) for every v, . . . ,vn such that [[RC]](v, . . . ,vn).
Thus, the presuppositions of ϕ and ψ in (50) can be roughly spelled out as in (52).
(52) a. ϕprs = W .
b. ψprs = YES∪NO
i. YES = {w | [[tall]]( j, t), for every t such that inw( j, t)};
ii.NO = {w |¬[[tall]]( j, t), for every t such that inw( j, t)}.
9This proposal is an elaboration of a suggestion by Danny Fox.
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Of course, ψprs asymmetrically entails ϕprs . Thus, the strengthened presupposition
of ϕ boils down to EXH(ϕprs) = ϕprs ∧¬ψprs = ¬ψprs . This strengthened presuppo-
sition is a contradiction given common knowledge W
ck in (28), since W ck entails
ψprs . Thus, the oddness of sentence (48a) follows from (23).
The situation is quite different in the case in which ‘John’ is replaced by a
bare plural or an indefinite as in (49), repeated below as ϕ in (53a), together with
the alternative ψ in (53b).
(53) a. ϕ = Firemen / a fireman are / is always tall.
b. ψ = Firemen / a fireman are / is GEN tall.
In the case of ϕ and ψ in (53), the Q-adverbs GEN and ‘always’ are quantifying
both over times and over firemen (see Diesing (1992) or Chierchia (1995) for dis-
cussion). Thus, the homogeneity presupposition for ψ yields (54b) in this case.
(54) a. ϕprs = W .
b. ψprs = YES∪NO
i. YES = {w | [[tall]](x,t), for every x,t such that [[firemen]]w(x) and inw(x,t)}
ii. NO = {w |¬[[tall]](x,t), for every x,t such that [[firemen]]w(x) and inw(x,t)}.
Again, ψprs asymmetrically entails ϕ and the strengthened presupposition of ϕ boils
down to EXH(ϕprs) = ϕprs ∧¬ψprs = ¬ψprs . But this time, ¬ψprs is not a contradic-
tion given the common knowledge W
ck in (28), since there are of course worlds
compatible with common knowledge where ψprs is false because some firemen are
tall while others are not. The felicity of sentences (49) is thus predicted. The ac-
count furthermore predicts that sentences of the type of (49) should sound odd in
cases where common knowledge entails that the individuals denoted by the BPS are
homogeneous with respect to the property denoted by the i-predicate. This predic-
tion seems to be borne out by the contrast in (55), pointed out to me by Danny Fox
(I am assuming that ‘speak’ is construed as an i-predicate here).
(55) a. Hebrew speakers speak a vary difficult language.
b. ?Hebrew speakers always speak a very difficult language.
3. Conclusions
The following two claims have been defended in the recent literature. First, that the
theory of scalar implicatures must be grammatical rather than pragmatic in nature.
Second, that a grammatical theory of scalar implicatures can be used to account for
facts which have a grammatical flavor. See for instance the account for the interven-
tion effect with NPIs in Chierchia (2004). In this paper, I have tried to contribute to
this line of research, by means of the following two claims. In Section 1, I have pre-
sented one more argument in favor of a grammatical rather than pragmatic theory
of implicatures, namely the BH (12). In Section 2, I have shown that some prop-
erties of i-predicates, which have been so far accounted for by means of specific
grammatical assumptions, naturally follow from a theory of implicatures endowed
with the BH.
References
Chierchia, Gennaro: 1995, ‘Individual-Level Predicates as Inherent Generics’, in
G. N. Carlson and F. J. Pelletier (eds.), The Generic Book, 125–175. The
Univ. of Chicago Press.
Chierchia, Gennaro: 1998, ‘Reference to Kinds Across Languages’, Natural Lan-
guage Semantics 6, 339–405.
Chierchia, Gennaro: 2004, ‘Scalar Implicatures, Polarity Phenomena and the Syn-
tax/Pragmatics Interface’, in A. Belletti (ed.), Structures and Beyond. Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford.
Diesing, Molly: 1992, Indefinites. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
von Fintel, Kai: 1997, ‘Bare Plurals, Bare Conditionals, and Only’, Journal of
Semantics 14, 1–56.
Fodor, Janet Dean: 1970, The Linguistic Description of Opaque Contexts, PhD
dissertation, MIT.
Fox, Danny: 1995, ‘Economy and Scope’, Natural Language Semantics 3, 283–
341.
Fox, Danny: 2006, ‘Free Choice and the Theory of Scalar Implicatures’. MIT ms.
Fox, Danny and Martin Hackl: 2005, ‘The Universal Density of Measurment’. ms.
Gajewski, Jon: 2005, Neg-Raising: Polarity and Presupposition, PhD dissertation,
MIT.
Hawkins, John A.: 1991, ‘On (In)Definite Articles: Implicatures and
(Un)Grammaticality Prediction’, Journal of Linguistics 27, 405–442.
Heim, Irene: 1991, ‘Artikel und Definitheit’, in A. von Stechow and D. Wunder-
lich (eds.), Semantik: Ein Internationales Handbuch der Zeitgeno¨ssischen
Forschung, 487–535. De Gruyter: Berlin.
Kratzer, Angelika: 1995, ‘Stage-Level and Individual-Level Predicates’, in G. N.
Carlson and F. J. Pelletier (eds.), The Generic Book, 125–175. The Univ.
of Chicago Press.
Maienborn, Claudia: 2004, ‘A Pragmatic Explanation of the Stage Level/Individual
Level Contrast in Combination with Locatives’, in B. Agbayani, V. Samiian,
and B. Tucker (eds.), Proceedings of the Western Conference of Linguistics
(WECOL), 158–170. Fresno: CSU. volume 15.
Percus, Orin: 2001, ‘Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial) (Temporal) Quantifica-
tion’. ms.
Percus, Orin J.: 1997, Aspects of ‘A’, PhD dissertation, MIT.
Sauerland, Uli: 2003a, ‘A New Semantics for Number’, in Proceedings of SALT13.
Sauerland, Uli: 2003b, ‘Implicated Presuppositions’, in Proceedings of “Polarity,
Scalar Phenomena, Implicatures”, Univ. of Milano Bicocca, June 18-20
2003.
The Blindness Hypothesis and Individual Level Predicates 119
